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Authentication or identification 
of real evidence1 refers to the re-
quirement that an item of evidence 
be proved to be genuine, that is, that 
it is what its proponent claims it to 
be. McCormick expressed the re-
quirement this way: "[W]hen real 
evidence is offered an adequate 
foundation for admission will re-
quire testimony first that the object 
offered is the object which was in-
volved in the incident, and further 
that the condition of the object is 
substantially unchanged."2 Federal 
Evidence Rule 901(a) codifies this 
requirement. 3 
*Albert J. Weatherhead ill & Rich-
ard W. Weatherhead Professor of Law, 
Case Western Reserve University. This 
column is based in part on P. Giannelli 
& E. Imwinkelried, Scientific Evidence 
(2d ed. 1993). Reprinted with permis-
sion. 
1 The term "real evidence" is used to 
describe tangible evidence that is his-
torically connected with a criminal case, 
as distinguished from evidence, such as 
a model, that is merely illustrative. 
2 2 McCormick, Evidence§ 212, at 
8 (4th ed. 1992). 
3 Fed. R. Evid. 901(a) ("The require-
ment of authentication or identification 
as a condition precedent to admissibil-
ity is satisfied by evidence sufficient to 
support a finding that the matter in ques-
tion is what its proponent claims."). 
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Condition of Evidence 
As the passage from McCormick 
indicates, sometimes the condition 
of an object is as important as its 
identity. Alteration of the item may 
reduce or negate its probative value 
and may mislead the jury. Thus, be-
fore physical objects are admissible 
in evidence the proponent must es-
tablish that they are in "substantially 
the same condition as when the 
crime was committed."4 
Determining what changes are 
"substantial" depends on how the 
changes affect the relevance of the 
evidence: "It should, however, al-
ways be borne in mind that founda-
tional requirements are essentially 
requirements of logic, and not rules 
of art. Thus, for example, even a 
radically altered item of real evi-
dence may be admissible if its per-
tinent features remain unaltered."5 
For example, in United States v. 
Skelley 6 counterfeit bills were ad-
missible even though they appar-
ently changed color because of tests 
4 Gallego v. United States, 276 F2d 
914,917 (9th Cir. 1960). Accord United 
States v. Zink, 612 F2d 511, 514 (1Oth 
Cir. 1980) ("condition is materially un-
changed"). 
5 2 McCormick at 8-9. 
6 501 F2d 447 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 
419 us 1051 (1974). 
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for fingerprints. According to the 
court, the change in color did not 
"destroy the relevance of the bills 
to show their counterfeit character 
from the identity of serial numbers, 
and their competence as evidence 
for this purpose [was] unimpaired by 
the . . . possibility of a change in 
color."7 
Identity of Evidence 
In criminal trials, it is often nec-
essary to show that the item seized, 
such as drugs, was the same item 
analyzed at the crime laboratory and 
introduced at trial. There are two 
principal methods of proving the 
identity of real evidence: first, es-
tablishing that the evidence is 
"readily identifiable," and second, 
establishing a "chain of custody." 
Readily Identifiable Evidence 
If an object is easily identified, 
"unique and readily identifiable", 8 
there may be no need to establish a 
chain of custody. As one court has 
noted: 
If an exhibit is directly identified 
by a witness as the object which 
is involved in the case, then that 
direct identification is sufficient. 
Such is the case with many ob-
jects which have special identi-
7 Id. at 451. See also Duke v. State, 
58 So. 2d 764, 769 (Ala. 1952) (shell 
admissible although sheriff scratched 
initials on it); Davidson v. State, 69 
SE2d 757, 759 (Ga. 1952) (victim's 
clothing admissible although washed); 
Bruce v. State, 375 NE2d 1042, 1073 
(Ind. 1978) (contamination "in no way 
vitiated the evidentiary value of the ex-
hibits"). 
8 2 McCormick at 8. 
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fying characteristics, such as a 
number or mark, or are made to 
have such identifying character-
istics by special marks.9 
The Federal Rules recognize this 
method of identification. Rule 
901(b)(4), entitled "Distinctive char-
acteristics and the like," provides 
that "[a]ppearance, contents, sub-
stance, internal patterns, or other 
distinctive characteristics, taken in 
conjunction with circumstances" 
may satisfy the authentication re-
quirement. 10 This method of proof 
is merely an application of the first-
hand knowledge 11 and opinion 
rules 12-the opinion of a lay witness 
based on personal observation. 
Numerous examples of authenti-
cating readily identifiable objects 
are found in the cases. All of these 
examples involve objects whose 
characteristics somehow make them 
umque. 
Serial Numbers 
Any item imprinted with a serial 
number, such as a weapon 13 or dol-
9 State v. Conley, 288 NE2d 296, 300 
(Ohio App. 1971). See also United 
States v. LePera, 443 F2d 810, 813 (9th 
Cir.) ("Counterfeit notes ... printed 
from a single plate, are unique and iden-
tifiable without proof of chain of cus-
tody"), cert. denied, 404 US 958 (1971). 
10 See United States v. Clonts, 966 
F2d 1366, 1368 (lOth Cir. 1992) ("If the 
evidence is unique, readily identifiable 
and resistant to change, the foundation 
for admission need only be testimony 
that the evidence is what it purports to 
be."). 
11 Fed. R. Evid. 602. 
12 Fed. R. Evid. 701. 
13 E.g., United States v. Douglas, 964 
F2d 738, 742 (8th Cir. 1992) ("Smith 
and Wesson with serial number 
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lar bill, 14 may be identified by that 
number. 
Police Markings 
An object that is inscribed with 
the initials or markings of a police 
officer or other person may be 
readily identifiable. In such cases, 
the person converts a nonunique 
object into a readily identifiable one 
by placing distinctive markings on 
it. This practice, recommended in 
crime scene and evidence collection 
manuals, 15 is well accepted in the 
cases. Firearms, 16 bullets, 17 cur-
rency, 18 laboratory slides, 19 and sun-
dry other objects20 have been admit-
79515"); State v. Kroeplin, 266 NW2d 
537, 540 (N.D. 1978). 
14 E.g., Calderon v. United States, 
269 F2d 416,419 (lOth Cir. 1959); State 
v. Conley, 288 NE2d 296, 300-301 
(OhioApp. 1971). 
15 See Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion, Handbook of Forensic Science 113 
(rev. ed. 1994). 
16 E.g., United States v. Madril, 445 
F2d 827, 828 (9th Cir. 1971) (pistol), 
vacated on other grounds, 404 US 1010 
(1972); Lilly v. State, 482 NE2d 457, 
459 (Ind. 1985). 
17 E.g., Sims v. State, 252 SE2d 501, 
503 (Ga. 1979); State v. Ross, 169 SE2d 
875, 878 (NC 1969), cert. denied, 397 
US 1050 (1970). See also Almodovar 
v. State, 464 NE2d 906, 911 (Ind. 1984) 
(initials scratched on shell casing). 
18 E.g., United States v. Capocci, 433 
F2d 155, 157 (1st Cir. 1970) (counter-
feit bill); United States v. Bourassa, 411 
F2d 69, 72-73 (lOth Cir.) (coin), cert. 
denied, 396 US 915 (1969). 
19 E.g., Gass v. United States, 416 
F2d 767,770 (DC Cir. 1969); Wheeler 
v. United States, 211 F2d 19,22-23 (DC 
Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 US 1019 
(1954). 
20 E.g., 0' Quinn v. United States, 411 
F2d 78,80 (lOth Cir. 1969) Gar); People 
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ted into evidence, at least in part, on 
this basis. 
Natural Marks 
An object may possess distinctive 
natural characteristics that may 
make it readily identifiable.Z1 For 
example, in United States v. Logan22 
a "gun-the only .25 Titan auto-
matic with a scratched-off serial 
number that Officer Grimes had ever 
seized-was admitted into evidence 
only after Officer Grimes identified 
it by make, model, size, color, style 
of its grip, and its scratched-off se-
rial number. We find the government 
made a prima facie showing of au-
thenticity. "23 
In United States v. Briddle 24 the 
prosecution introduced evidence 
that a button top found at the scene 
of a burglary came from the 
defendant's coat. The police officer 
described the button as follows: 
It had a picture of a whale on the 
front of it. It was leather .... And 
v. Horace, 9 Cal. Rptr. 43, 44 (App. 
1960) (crowbar); State v. Engberg, 708 
P2d 935, 939 (Idaho App. 1985) (seiz-
ing officer placed initials on poker ma-
chine); People v. Sansone, 356 NE2d 
101,103 (Ill.App.l976)(stolenrecord 
albums); Johnson v. State, 370 NE2d 
892, 894-895 (Ind. 1977) (knife); State 
v. Coleman, 441 SW2d 46, 51 (Mo. 
1969) (box, watch, and bolt). 
21 E.g., United States v. Reed, 392 
F2d 865, 867 (7th Cir.) ("very unusual 
looking hat"), cert. denied, 393 US 984 
(1968); Reyes v. United States, 383 F2d, 
734, 734 (9th Cir. 1967) (holdup note 
"was unique and readily identifiable"). 
22 949 F2d 1370 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. 
denied, 503 US 925 (1992). 
23 Id. at 1378. 
24 443 F2d 443 (8th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 404 US 942 (1971). 
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it had a sticky substance on the 
back, as though it might have 
been stuck to something .... [I]t 
was a dark brown in color. Had a 
whale or fish on it. The tail was 
up in the air. Split. And I believe 
it was the left eye of the animal 
that was up.25 
The Eighth Circuit held this identi-
fication sufficient: "Given the 
uniqueness of the buttons on 
Briddle's coat, we think this identi-
fication evidence established that the 
exhibit ... was the button top found 
at the scene of the burglary."26 Thus, 
the issue is whether the distinctive 
characteristics are sufficient to make 
it unlikely that another object would 
have the same characteristics.27 
Witness :S Uncertainty 
A witness's uncertainty in iden-
tifying an exhibit, however, affects 
the weight, not the admissibility, of 
the evidence. For example, the Ninth 
Circuit has written: 
[A]lthough the trial record reveals 
the identification of the ax made 
by Papse may not have been en-
tirely free from doubt, the witness 
did state that he was "pretty sure" 
this was the weapon Johnson had 
used against him, that he saw the 
ax in Johnson's hand, and that he 
was personally familiar with this 
particular ax because he had used 
it in the past. Based on Papse's 
testimony, a reasonable juror 
could have found that his ax was 
the weapon allegedly used in the 
25 Id. at 448. 
26 Id. at 449. 
27 See 2 Wigmore, Evidence § 411 
(Chadbourn rev. 1979). 
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assault. Papse's ability or inabil-
ity to specify particular identify-
ing features of the ax, as well as 
the evidence of the ax's alleged 
changed condition, should then 
go to the question of weight to be 
accorded this evidence, which is 
precisely what the trial court 
ruled. In other words, although 
the jury remained free to reject the 
government's assertion that this 
ax had been used in the assault, 
the requirements for admissibil-
ity specified in Rule 901(a) had 
been met.28 
Chain of Custody 
The use of a chain of custody to 
authenticate evidence is well estab-
lished. Nevertheless, two commen-
tators have written that the govern-
ing federal rule "can easily be read 
as doing away with any chain of 
custody requirement;"29 This seems 
unwise. If anything, there is a need 
for more stringent requirements. The 
mass processing of immunoassay 
tests and the increasing volume of 
DNA testing heightens the impor-
tance of proper handling procedures. 
Indeed, improper labeling has been 
found to be the cause of an error in 
a DNA proficiency test.30 
28 United States v.Johnson, 637 F2d 
1224, 1247-1248 (9th Cir. 1980). Ac-
cord United States v. Drumright, 534 
F2d 1383, 1385 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 
429 US 960 (1976); United States v. 
Capocci, 433 F2d 155, 157 (1st Cir. 
1970); United States v. Rizzo, 418 F2d 
71, 81 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 
us 967 (1970). 
29 2 Saltzburg & Martin, Federal 
Rules of Evidence Manual478 (5th ed. 
1990) (citing Fed. R. Evid. 901(a)). 
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Need for Chain of Custody 
In some situations the proponent 
must establish a chain of custody. 
Such proof may be necessary either 
because the item of evidence is not 
readily identifiable, or because more 
than simple identification is neces-
sary to establish the item's rel-
evance. 
Fungible Items 
A chain of custody is often re-
quired for fungible evidence because 
these items have no unique charac-
teristics. The inability to distinguish 
between fungible items makes posi-
tive identification by observation 
alone impossible.31 In addition, the 
nature of these items frequently 
makes them particularly susceptible 
to tampering or loss.32 Nevertheless, 
the proper handling of fungible evi-
dence-using lock-sealed enve-
lopes33 or containers that custodians 
then mark and initial-makes the 
30 Thompson, "The Myth of DNA 
Fingerprints," 9 Cal. Law. 34 (Apr. 
1989) (Cellmark official admitted that 
the "error occurred because a lab tech-
nician incorrectly labeled a vial."). 
31 See State v. Conley, 288 NE2d 
296,300 (OhioApp. 1971) ("One white 
pill looks much like any other white pill 
and hence positive identification sim-
ply by observation is usually impos-
sible."). 
32 The "danger of tampering, loss, or 
mistake with respect to an exhibit is 
greatest where the exhibit is small and 
is one which has physical characteris-
tics fungible in nature and similar in 
form to substances familiar to people 
in their daily lives." Graham v. State, 
255 NE2d 652, 655 (Ind. 1970). 
33 Lock-sealed envelopes "can be 
opened only by destroying the seals." 
United States v. Santiago, 534 F2d 768, 
770 (7th Cir. 1976). 
451 
evidence readily identifiable and 
eliminates most problems of misiden-
tification and contamination.34 
Lab Analysis 
If the relevance of an exhibit de-
pends on its subsequent laboratory 
analysis, identification by police 
markings made at the scene does not 
provide a sufficient foundation. The 
markings establish that the exhibit 
in court was the item seized by the 
police, but a chain of custody may 
be necessary to establish that the 
item seized was the item analyzed 
at the crime laboratory. For example, 
in Robinson v. Commonwealth,35 the 
court reversed a rape conviction due 
to a break in the chain of custody: 
"The mere fact that the blouse and 
the panties were identified (by the 
victim at trial] did not prove the 
chain of possession necessary to vali-
date the F.B.I. analysis of them. "36 
Condition 
If the condition of the object, not 
merely its identity, is the relevant 
34 See United States v. Pressly, 978 
F2d 1026, 1028 (8th Cir. 1992) ("The 
officer who seized the substances [co-
caine] testified that he marked them at 
the time of the seizure and that the pack-
ages admitted into evidence still bore 
his marks."); People v. Rivera, 592 
NYS2d 697 (App. Div. 1993) (failure 
of arresting officer to mark six fungible 
glassine envelopes of heroin at time of 
seizure resulted in a gap in the chain of 
custody that required a reversal). 
35 183 SE2d 179 (Va. 1971). 
36 Id. at 181. See also Graham v. 
State, 255 NE2d 652, 655-656 (Ind. 
1970) (wrapper containing white pow-
der was initialed at time police took 
possession but break in chain of cus-
tody prior to chemical analysis resulted 
in reversal). 
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issue, a chain of custody may be re-
quired to establish that the object 
was not altered during police cus-
tody. This requirement is a neces-
sary safeguard for evidence that is 
susceptible to undetected contami-
nation or deterioration, such as blood 
samples37 and substances subjected to 
neutron activation analysis.38 
Length of Chain 
When a chain of custody is re-
quired, either to show the identity 
of the item or its unchanged condi-
tion, it is necessary to determine 
where the chain begins and ends. 
Only breaks in possession that oc-
cur within the period included in the 
chain of custody affect admissibility. 
37 See Ritter v. State, 462 SW2d 247, 
249 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1970) ("Blood 
specimens ... should be handled with 
the greatest of care and all persons who 
handle the specimen should be ready to 
identify it and testify to its custody and 
unchanged condition"). See also 
Glendening &Waugh, "The Stability of 
Ordinary Blood Alcohol Samples Held 
Various Periods of Time Under Differ-
ent Conditions," 10 J. Forensic Sci. 192, 
199 (1965) (showing instability of al-
cohol content in blood samples for dif-
ferent temperatures and storage peri-
ods). 
38 See Comment, "The Evidentiary 
Uses of Neutron Activation Analysis," 
59 Cal. L. Rev. 997, 1013 (1971) ("If 
two unknowns that are compared to 
determine whether they came from a 
common source have both been con-
taminated in a similar way, it is clear 
that completely false points of similar-
ity can result"); State v. Johnson, 539 
SW2d 493, 505 (Mo. App. 1976) (con-
trol sample used to establish that Neu-
tron Activation Analysis sample was 
uncontaminated), cert. denied, 430 US 
934 (1977). 
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Initial Link 
Disputes over the initial link in 
the chain of custody focus on 
whether the continuous possession 
requirement should apply at the time 
of the incident at issue or at the time 
when the evidence comes into pos-
session of its proponent. According 
to one position, a "chain-of-custody 
foundation is not required ... for 
periods before the evidence comes 
into the possession of law enforce-
ment personnel."39 The theory un-
derlying this rule is that "the State 
cannot be charged with the respon-
sibility of accounting for the custody 
of the exhibit" when it is not in its 
possession.40 This rule has been ap-
plied in two different types of cases: 
first, those in which a third party had 
possession of the object prior to the 
time it was turned over to the po-
lice,41 and second, those in which the 
object was not discovered at the 
crime scene until sometime after the 
commission of the crime. 42 
This position misconceives the 
purpose of the chain of custody rule. 
The rule is not designed to hold the 
police accountable, but rather to en-
sure that evidence is relevant. Po-
lice accountability is a means to this 
end. If the relevance of an object 
depends on its use in a crime, the 
39 Williams v. State, 379 NE2d 981, 
984 (Ind. 1978). 
40 Zupp v. State, 283 NE2d 540, 543 
(Ind. 1972). 
41 E.g., Zupp v. State, 283 NE2d 540, 
543 (Ind. 1972); Love v. State, 383 
NE2d 382, 384 (Ind. App. 1978). 
42 See Williams v. State, 379 NE2d 
981, 984 (Ind. 1978) (three-hour delay 
in discovery of revolver); Thornton v. 
State, 376 NE2d 492, 494 (Ind. 1978) 
(knife discovered in open field subse-
quent to arrest). 
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offering party must establish, 
through a chain of custody or other-
wise, a connection between that ob-
ject and the crime.43 For example, if 
a third party finds a rifle near a crime 
scene and turns it over to the police 
several hours or days after the crime, 
it would be necessary to "account" 
for the rifle during the time it was in 
the third party's possession in order 
to tie the rifle to the place where the 
crime occurred. 44 
Final Link 
Disagreement over the point at 
which the chain of custody ends fo-
cuses on whether the chain ends 
when the item is introduced at trial 
or at an earlier stage, for example, 
when a laboratory analyzes the item. 
Some commentators have read sev-
eral cases as requiring the prosecu-
tion to trace the chain of custody 
from the time of seizure until the 
43 In United States v. White, 569 F2d 
263 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 US 848 
(1978), the court noted: "This is not a 
routine chain of custody situation in 
which the chain is broken between sei-
zure of the evidence from the accused 
and a subsequent trial. Rather, the al-
leged break occurred before the govern-
ment came into possession of the 
heroin." Id. at 266. After citing the rule 
in the "typical chain of custody cases," 
the court wrote: "We apply the same 
rule in the instant case." Id. 
44 See United States v. Gelzer, 50 F3d 
1133, 1141 (2d Cir. 1995) ("The gov-
ernment concedes that there was not a 
'full' chain of custody established for 
the revolver alleged to have been used 
during the robberies and to have been 
discarded during the car chase. At trial, 
Officer Staub testified that he found the 
revolver on Scranton Avenue near the 
intersection of Picadilly Downs and 
gave it to Officer Curtis.") (evidence 
admitted). 
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time of trial in all cases.45 There may 
be some support for this view in the 
Advisory Committee's Note to Fed-
eral Rule 901, where the drafters 
refer to "establishing narcotics as 
taken from an accused and account-
ing for custody through the period 
until trial, including laboratory 
analysis."46 
The "length" of the chain of cus-
tody, however, depends on the pur-
pose for which the evidence is of-
fered. This point is illustrated by 
State v. Conley, 47 which involved a 
prosecution for the illegal sale of 
LSD. The drugs were purchased 
with marked bills whose serial num-
bers had been recorded. The defen-
dant objected to both the admissi-
bility of the bills and the LSD. The 
court wrote: 
To identify a particular item ... 
as being part of a pe1tinent inci-
dent in the past usually requires 
the showing of a continuous chain 
of custodians up to the material 
moment. When a chemical analy-
sis is involved ... the material 
moment is the moment of analy-
sis, since this provides the basis 
for the expert testimony and 
makes that testimony relevant to 
the case. In the case of many other 
items, the material moment oc-
curs at the trial. 48 
45 See Annotation, "Proof of identity 
of person or thing where object, speci-
men, or part is taken from a human 
body, as basis for admission of testi-
mony or report of expert or officer based 
on such object, specimen, or part," 21 
ALR2d 1216, 1236 (1952). 
46 Fed. R. Evid. 901, advisory com-
mittee note. 
47 288 NE2d 296 (Ohio App. 1971). 
48 Id. at 300. 
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The court went on to hold that the 
chain of custody for the marked bills 
ran from the time the bills were 
marked until the trial, at which time 
they were identified. The chain of 
custody for the drugs differed; it ran 
from the time of seizure to the time 
of chemical analysis. 49 
As a matter of relevance, this ap-
proach is sound. The loss or destruc-
tion of the drugs after chemical 
analysis would not affect the rel-
evance of the expert's testimony 
concerning the nature of the drugs. 50 
Moreover, the prosecution generally 
is not required to introduce real evi-
dence to prove its case: 
It is not always necessary that tan-
gible evidence be physically ad-
mitted at a trial. ... Even when 
evidence is available it need not 
be physically offered. Thus, the 
grand larceny of an automobile 
may be established merely on 
competent testimony describing 
the stolen vehicle without actu-
ally producing the automobile 
before the trier of fact.s' 
49 See United States v. Grant, 967 
F2d 81, 83 (2d Cir. 1992) ("In order for 
the chemist's testimony to be relevant, 
there must be some likelihood that the 
substance tested by the chemist was the 
substance seized at the airport."), cert. 
denied, 507 US 924 (1993). 
50 See United States v. Bailey, 277 
F2d 560, 565 (7th Cir. 1960) ("Even if 
the exhibits, including the heroin, had 
not been introduced in evidence the tes-
timony of the witnesses and the stipu-
lation as to the chemical analysis were 
sufficient. ... "); United States v. Sears, 
248 F2d 377, 378 (7th Cir. 1957), cert. 
denied, 355 US 602 (1958). 
51 Holle v. State, 337 A2d 163, 166 
(Md. App. 1975) (stolen marked cur-
rency). Accord United States v. Kelly, 
14F3d 1169, 1176(7thCir.l994)("The 
454 
The so-called "best evidence" rule 
applies only to writings, recordings, 
and photographs, not to real evi-
dence.52 
Nevertheless, the Florida Su-
preme Court has adopted a contrary 
position. According to the court, 
"when a defendant is charged with 
possession of a controlled substance, 
that substance, if available, must be 
introduced into evidence."53 In sup-
port of this rule, the court wrote: 
An absolute rule that a substance 
may be introduced or not at the 
discretion of the prosecutor is 
·practically undesirable because of 
its potential for abuse. For ex-
ample, such prosecutorial discre-
tion could deliberately or unwit-
tingly be used to confuse defense 
counsel and thwart the ability to 
make certain objections, par-
ticularly objections to chain of 
custody .... 
The state's failure to introduce 
the substance in evidence against 
the defendant might put the de-
fendant in the awkward position 
of introducing it himself should 
he wish to challenge its authentic-
ity where there has been testimony 
of its existence as here .... 54 
In addition, the loss or destruction 
of the evidence after laboratory 
government is not required to introduce 
narcotics in evidence to obtain a nar-
cotics conviction."); United States v. 
Figueroa, 618 F2d 934, 941 (2d Cir. 
1980) (heroin); Chandler v. United 
States, 318 F2d 356, 357 (lOth Cir. 
1963) (whiskey bottles). 
52 See Fed. R. Evict. 1002. 
53 G.E.G. v. State, 417 So. 2d 975, 
977 (Fla. 1982). 
54 Id. at 977-998. 
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analysis may affect the defendant's 
right to reexamine the evidence, 
which could result in the exclusion 
of expert testimony based on the 
prior laboratory examination. 55 
Links in Chain 
The "links" in the chain of cus-
tody are those persons who have had 
physical custody of the object. Per-
sons who have had access to, but not 
possession of, the evidence gener-
ally need not be accounted for. Such 
persons are not custodians. As noted 
by one court: "There is no rule re-
quiring the prosecution to produce 
as witnesses all persons who were 
in a position to come into contact 
with the article sought to be intro-
duced in evidence.56 
Failure to account for the evi-
dence during possession by a custo-
dian may constitute a critical break 
in the chain of custody.57 Some 
55 See 1 Giannelli & Imwinkelried, 
Scientific Evidence § 3-7 (2d ed. 1993) 
(constitutional duty to preserve evi-
dence). 
56 Gallego v. United States, 276 F2d 
914,917 (9th Cir. 1960).Accord United 
States v. Fletcher, 487 F2d 22, 23 (5th 
Cir. 1973) (fact that "fifteen persons had 
access to the evidence room" affects 
weight, not admissibility), cert. denied, 
416 us 958 (1974). 
57 E.g., United States v. Panczko, 353 
F2d 676, 679 (7th Cir. 1965) ("There is 
no evidence as to where or from whom 
Lieutenant Rernkus got the keys"), cert. 
denied, 383 US 935 (1966); Novak v. 
District of Columbia, 160 F2d 588, 589 
(DC Cir. 1947) (evidence failed "to 
identify the sample from which the 
analyses were made as being that 
sample taken from the appellant"); 
Smith v. United States, 157 F2d 705 
(DC Cir. 1946) (witness testified that 
watch presented in court had been 
handed to him by police officer at scene 
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courts have indicated that all the 
links in the chain of custody must 
testify at triaJ.58 The prevalent view, 
however, is that "the fact of a 'miss-
ing link does not prevent the admis-
sion of real evidence, so long as 
there is sufficient proof that the evi-
dence is what it purports to be.' "59 
Thus, while a custodian in the chain 
of possession need not testify under 
all circumstances, the evidence 
should be accounted for during the 
time it was under that custodian's 
control. Several recurrent examples 
of "missing link" cases are discussed 
in this article. 
Infonnants 
The authentication of evidence by 
means other than the testimony of 
custodial links frequently arises in 
drug cases where an informant who 
has handled the drugs does not tes-
tify at trial. In this situation, an un-
dercover officer who had accompa-
nied the informant can testify about 
the informant's handling of the 
drugs. Thus, a noncustodian with 
but he did not see where officer obtained 
watch); United States v. Lewis, 19 MJ 
869 (AFCMR 1985) (prosecution failed 
to show that urine sample analyzed at 
lab was the sample taken from the de-
fendant). 
58 E.g., People v. Connelly, 316 NE2d 
706, 708 (NY 1974) ("Admissibility 
generally requires that all those who 
have handled the item 'identify it and 
testify to its custody and unchanged 
condition'"). 
59 United States v. Howard-Arias, 
679 F2d 363, 366 (4th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 459 US 874 (1982). See also 
United States v. Harrington, 923 F2d 
1371, 1374 (9th Cir.) ("[T]he prosecu-
tion was not required to call the custo-
dian of the evidence"), cert. denied, 502 
us 852 (1991). 
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firsthand knowledge may supply 
evidence of the object's handling 
while in the custody of the nontesti-
fying informant. 60 
The testimony of a custodial link 
also may be dispensed with when 
circumstantial evidence sufficiently 
connects a defendant with drugs 
purchased from him by an infor-
mant, that is, a "controlled drug 
buy." For example, in Peden v. 
United States 61 an informant was 
searched prior to a drug transaction 
and provided with marked money. 
While under surveillance, she met 
the defendant, and both were imme-
diately arrested and searched. The 
informant had morphine and the de-
fendant had the marked money. Al-
though the informant did not testify, 
the court held the chain sufficient to 
connect the defendant to the mor-
phine.62 
Postal Employees 
Postal employees who handle 
evidence sent to a crime laboratory 
by mail are custodial links. Postal 
employees rarely, if ever, testify at 
trial, however. A rule requiring ev-
ery custodian to testify would neces-
sitate calling all postal employees 
who handled the evidence. This 
would "place an impossible burden 
60 E.g., United States v. Jones, 404 
F. Supp. 529, 542 (ED Pa. 1975) (un-
dercover agent observed defendant gi v-
ing drugs to informant; informant did 
not testify), aff'd, 538 F2d 321 (3d Cir. 
1976). 
61 223 F2d 319 (DC Cir. 1955), cert. 
denied, 359 US 971 (1959). 
62 Id. at 321. See also United States 
v. Amaro, 422 F2d 1078, I 080 (9th Cir. 
1970). 
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upon the state."63 Therefore, courts 
invoke the presumption that "articles 
transported by regular United States 
mail and delivered in the ordinary 
course of the mails are delivered in 
substantially the same condition in 
which they were sent."64 
Many law enforcement agencies 
recommend registered mail or other 
similar means for sending evi-
dence.65 Furthermore, the FBI rec-
ommends stringent packaging re-
quirements for items mailed to its 
laboratory. 66 Proof that these proce-
dures were followed, and not the 
presumption of due delivery, assures 
the reliability of the evidence. 
Minor Links 
Another category of cases in-
volves what rriay be called "minor 
links" -intermediate custodians 
who have possession for a short pe-
riod of time and merely passed the 
evidence along to another link. For 
example, in one case a chief chem-
ist, who had received a sealed enve-
63 Trantham v. State, 508 P2d 1104, 
1107 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973). 
64 Schacht v. State, 50 NW2d 78, 80 
(Neb. 1951). See also Pasadena Re-
search Lab., Inc. v. United States, 169 
F2d 375, 382 (9th Cir.) (presumption 
of regularity applies to postal employ-
ees' handling of vials during shipment), 
cert. denied, 335 US 853 (1948). 
65 F.B.I., supra note 15 at 103 (citing 
U.S. Postal Service, United Parcel Ser-
vice, Federal Express). See also United 
States v. Godoy, 528 F2d 281, 283 (9th 
Cir. 1975) (narcotics sent by registered 
mail to laboratory); United States v. 
Jackson, 482 F2d, 1254, 1266 (8th Cir. 
1973) (registered, special delivery, air 
mail). 
66 F.B.I., supra note 15 at 92 (use 
suitable containers, package each item 
separately, and seal securely). 
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lope of heroin and then turned it over 
to the examining chemist, did not 
testify. The court upheld the 
admisibility of the evidence because 
the seal was "unbroken when the 
latter received it. " 67 The category of 
minor links whose testimony is not 
required to establish a chain of cus-
tody includes not only laboratory 
personnel,68 but also police officers 
who receive evidence from a seiz-
ing officer and mail69 or transporC0 
it to a laboratory for analysis. 
In short, "accounting for" all the 
links in the chain of custody does 
not necessarily mean all the links 
need testify at trial. 
67 United States v. Picard, 464 F2d 
215,216 n.l (1st Cir. 1972). 
68 E.g., United States v. Williams, 
809 F2d 75, 89-90 (1st Cir. 1986) (lab 
technician need not testify), cert. de-
nied, 482 US 906 (1987); United States 
v. Glaze, 643 F2d 549, 552 (8th Cir. 
1981) (nontestifying chemist received 
and transported narcotics to testifying 
chemist). 
69 E.g., United States v. Gelzer, 50 
F3d 1133,1141 (2dCir.l995)("Attrial, 
Officer Staub testified that he found the 
revolver on Scranton Avenue ... and 
gave it to Officer Curtis. Next, Postal 
Inspector Morrison testified that he re-
ceived the revolver from Detective 
Curtis and sent it to Washington, D.C., 
for forensic testing."); United States v. 
Jones, 404 F. Supp. 529, 543 (ED Pa. 
1975) (testimony of officer who mailed 
heroin to lab not necessary where sealed 
packages initialed and return receipt 
introduced), aff'd 538 F2d 321 (3d Cir. 
1976); United States v. Marks, 32 F. 
Supp. 459, 460 (D. Conn. 1940) (po-
lice officer who mailed heroin died prior 
to trial; officer's handwriting on sealed 
envelopes identified and package sent 
by registered mail). 
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Burden and Standard of Proof 
The burden of proving the chain 
of custody rests with the party of-
fering the evidence.71 Prior to the 
adoption of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, the courts described the stan-
dard of proof in various ways. The 
most common expression of the 
standard was that the offering party 
had to establish the identity and con-
dition of the exhibit by a "reason-
able probability."72 Phrases such as 
"reasonable certainty"73 and "rea-
sonable assurance"74 seem only vari-
ants of this standard. The reasonable 
probability standard appears to re-
quire no more than the "preponder-
ance of evidence" or "more probable 
than not" standard, 75 and some 
70 E.g., United States v. Lampson, 
627 F2d 62, 65 (7th Cir. 1980) (deputy 
sheriff who transported evidence did not 
testify); Bay v. State, 489 NE2d 1220, 
1223 (Ind. App. 1986) (detective who 
transported marijuana to lab did not tes-
tify). 
71 See United States v. Santiago, 534 
F2d 768, 770 (7th Cir. 1976); 1 
Wigmore, Evidence§ 18, at 841 (Tillers 
rev. 1983). 
72 E.g., United States v. Brown, 482 
F2d 1226, 1228 (8th Cir. 1973) ("rea-
sonable probability the article has not 
been changed in any important re-
spect''); United States v. Capocci, 433 
F2d 155, 157 (1st Cir. 1970). 
73 See United States v. Jones, 404 F. 
Supp. 529,543 (ED Pa. 1975); Sorce v. 
State, 497 P2d 902, 903 (Nev. 1972). 
74 See State v. Cress, 344 A2d 57, 61 
(Me. 1975); State v. Baines, 394 SW2d 
312, 316 (Mo. 1965), cert. denied, 384 
US 992 (1966); People v. Julian, 360 
NE2d 1310, 1313 (NY 1977). 
75 See People v. Riser, 305 P2d 1, 10 
(Cal.) ("The requirement of reasonable 
certainty is not met when some vital link 
in the chain of possession is not ac-
counted for, because then it is as likely 
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courts have explicitly expressed the 
standard in those terms.76 This stan-
dard is the typical standard in evi-
dence law-77 Under this view, chain of 
custody "requirements go to the com-
petency of the evidence, not merely 
to its credibility."78 Under this view, 
the trial court determines whether this 
standard has been satisfied.79 
Federal Rules 
In contrast, Federal Rule 90l(a) 
requires only that the offering party 
introduce "evidence sufficient to 
support a finding that the matter in 
question is what its proponent 
claims." Thus, the trial court does 
not decide whether the item has been 
identified by a preponderance of the 
as not that the evidence analyzed was 
not the evidence originally received"), 
appeal dismissed, 358 US 646 (1959); 
State v. Serl, 269 NW2d 785, 788-789 
(SD 1978). 
76 See State v. Henderson, 337 So. 
2d 204, 206 (La. 1976); State v. Will-
iams, 273 So. 2d 280, 281 (La. 1973) 
("clear preponderance"). 
77 See Bourjaily v. United States, 
483 US 171, 175 (1987) ("We have 
traditionally required that these [pre-
liminary] matters be established by a 
preponderance of proof."). See also 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceu-
ticals, Inc.; 113 S. Ct. 2786) (1993) 
(preponderance of evidence standard 
applies to the admissibility of expert 
testimony under Fed. Evid. R. 
104(a)). 
78 State v. Serl, 269 NW2d 785, 789 
(SD 1978). 
79 
"That determination is to be made 
by the trial judge, not the jury. . . . " 
United States v. Brown, 482 F2d 1226, 
1228 (8th Cir. 1973). Accord United 
States v. Daughtry, 502 F2d 1019, 
1021-1023 (5th Cir. 1974); United 
States v. Stevenson, 445 F2d 25, 27 (7th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 US 857 (1971). 
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evidence; rather, the court decides 
only whether sufficient evidence has 
been introduced from which a rea-
sonable jury could find the evidence 
identified. 80 In other words, the of-
fering party need only make a "prima 
facie"81 showing of authenticity to gain 
admissibility, and the jury decides fi-
nally whether the evidence has been 
sufficiently identified. 82 
Not only is the prima facie stan-
dard less stringent than the "more 
probable than not" standard, but it 
also results in a different rule con-
cerning the application of the rules 
of evidence. Federal Rule 104(a) 
provides that in deciding prelimi-
nary questions of admissibility the 
trial court "is not bound by the rules 
of evidence except those with re-
spect to privileges."83 Accordingly, 
80 See Zenith Radio Corp. v. 
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F. 
Supp. 1190, 1219 (ED Pa. 1980)("The 
Advisory Committee Note to Rule 
104(b) makes plain that preliminary 
questions of conditional relevancy are 
not determined solely by the judge, for 
to do so would greatly restrict the func-
tion of the jury .... "), rev'd on other 
grounds, 723 F2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), 
rev'd, 475 US 574 (1986). 
81 See United States v. Sparks, 2 F3d 
574, 582 (5th Cir. 1993) (Prosecution 
need only make a "prima facie" show-
ing that bottles of crack seized from 
accused were the drugs analyzed); 
United States v. Ortiz, 966 F2d 707, 716 
(1st Cir. 1992) (Rule 901(a) "does not 
erect a particularly high hurdle."). 
82 See United States v. Goichman, 
547 F2d 778, 784 (3d Cir. 1976) ("[I]t 
is the jury who will ultimately deter-
mine the authenticity of the evidence, 
not the court."). 
83 See also United States v. Matlock, 
415 US 164, 172-173 (1974) ("[T]he 
rules of evidence normally applicable 
in criminal trials do not operate with full 
force at hearings before the judge to 
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if the admissibility decision is en-
trusted to the trial court under the 
"more probable than not" standard, 
evidence rules would not be appli-
cable and hearsay could be consid-
ered by the court. Rule 104(b), 
which governs questions of condi-
tional relevancy, is an exception to 
Rule 1 04(a). If Rule 1 04(b) controls, 
the rules of evidence apply because 
the jury must share in the authentic-
ity decision: 
[W]hile the court's power to 
"consider" inadmissible evidence 
under Rule 104(a) is clear, the 
substantive determination which 
the court is required to make on 
the issue of authentication is 
whether admissible evidence ex-
ists which is sufficient to support 
a jury finding of authenticity .... 
[O]ur task in ruling on authentic-
ity is limited to determining 
whether there is substantial ad-
missible evidence to support a 
finding of authentication by the 
trier of fact. 84 
Since the Federal Rules treat authen-
tication as a matter of conditional 
relevance, that is, they adopt the 
prima facie evidence standard, evi-
dence rules apply in this context. 
Whether the Federal Rules of 
Evidence were intended to effect a 
major change in the chain of custody 
requirements is unclear. Two com-
mentators have written that "Rule 
901(a) can easily be read as doing 
determine the admissibility of evi-
dence."). 
84 Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita 
Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1190, 
1220 (ED Pa. 1980) (emphasis added), 
rev' d on other grounds, 723 F2d 238 
(3d Cir. 1983), rev'd 475 US 574 
(1986). 
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away with any chain of custody re-
quirement."85 Several decisions of 
the Fifth Circuit contain language 
that supports this view. For example, 
the court has written that "chain of 
custody goes to the weight rather 
than the admissibility of the evi-
dence, and is thus reserved for the 
jury. "86 The Second Circuit also ap-
pears to have adopted this less strin-
gent standard: "Fed. R. Evid. 901 
requires that to meet the admissibil-
ity threshold the government need 
only prove a rational basis for con-
cluding that an exhibit is what it is 
claimed to be."87 
Other federal courts of appeal, 
however, continue to apply the "rea-
sonable probability" standard that 
applied before the Federal Rules of 
Evidence wereadopted.88 Moreover, 
85 2 Saltzburg & Martin, Federal 
Rules of Evidence Manual478 (5th ed. 
1990). But see Analysis, Mil. R. Evid. 
901 ("There appears to be no reason to 
believe that the rule will change present 
law as it affects chains of custody for 
real evidence especially iffungible."). 
86 Ballou v. Henri Studios, Inc., 656 
F2d 1147, 1154(5thCir.198l).Accord 
United States v. Johnson, 68 F3d 899, 
903 (5th Cir. 1995) ("Any break in the 
chain of custody affects the weight, not 
the admissibility of evidence. Thus, if 
the district court correctly finds that the 
government has made a prima facie 
showing of authenticity, then the evi-
dence is admissible, and issues of au-
thenticity are for the jury to decide."); 
United States v. Shaw, 920 F2d 1225, 
1229-1230 (5th Cir) ("any break in the 
chain of custody of physical evidence 
does not render the evidence inadmis-
sible but instead goes to the weight that 
the jury should accord that evidence."), 
cert. denied, 500 US 926 (1991). 
87 United States v. Hon, 904 F2d 803, 
809 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 US 
1069 (1991). 
88 E.g., United States v. Williams, 44 
F3d 614, 618 (7th Cir. 1995) ("reason-
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decisions of both the Fifth89 and Sec-
ond Circuits90 also cite the "reasonable 
probability" standard as the threshold 
requirement under Rule 901. 
The standard on appeal for re-
viewing a trial court's decision on 
identification is whether it is an 
abuse of the court's discretion. 91 
State Rules 
Some state adaptations of the 
Federal Rules specifically require a 
chain of custody. For example, 
Alaska Rule 90l(a) provides: 
(I) Whenever the prosecution 
in a criminal trial offers (A) real 
evidence which is of such a na-
ture as not to be readily identifi-
able, or as to be susceptible to 
adulteration, contamination, 
modification, tampering, or other 
changes in form attributable to 
able likelihood"); United States v. 
Harrington, 923 F2d 1371, 1374 (9th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 502 US 852 (1991); 
United States v. Cardenas, 864 F2d 
1528, 1532 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 491 
US 909 (1989); United States v. Rans, 
851 F2d 1111, 1114 (8th Cir. 1988). 
89 See Ballou v. Henri Studios, Inc., 
656 F2d 1147, 1155 (5th Cir. 1981); 
United States v. Albert, 595 F2d 283, 
290 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 US 963 
(1979). 
90 United States v. Gelzer, 50 F3d 
1133, 1141 (2d Cir. 1995) ("There was 
sufficient evidence to establish that it 
is more likely than not that the revolver 
offered at trial was the same as that re-
covered by Officer Staub."). 
91 E.g., United States v. Ladd, 885 
F2d 954, 956 (1st Cir. 1989); United 
States v. Jones, 687 F2d 1265, 1267 (8th 
Cir. 1982); United States v. Howard-
Arias, 679 F2d 363, 366 (4th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 459 US 874 (1982); United 
States v. Mullins, 638 F2d 1151, 1152 
(8th Cir. 1981). 
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accident, carelessness, error or 
fraud, or (B) testimony describ-
ing real evidence of the type set 
forth in (A) if the information on 
which the description is based 
was acquired while the evidence 
was in the custody or control of 
the prosecution, the prosecution 
must first demonstrate as a mat-
ter of reasonable certainty that the 
evidence is at the time of trial or 
was at the time it was observed 
properly identified and free of the 
possible taints identified by this 
paragraph. 
(2) In any case in which real 
evidence of the kind described in 
subparagraph (1) of this subdivi-
sion is offered, the court may re-
quire additional proof before de-
ciding whether to admit or 
exclude evidence under Rule 403. 
Application of the Standard of 
Proof 
To satisfy its burden of proof, the 
prosecution need not eliminate ev-
ery possibility of substitution, alter-
ation, or tampering. The "mere pos-
sibility of a break in the chain does 
not render the physical evidence in-
admissible, but raises the question 
of weight to be accorded by the 
jury."92 Accordingly, discrepancies 
concerning the weight,93 number,94 
92 United States v. Jardina, 747 F2d 
945, 951 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 
470 us 1058 (1985). 
93 See United States v. Godoy, 528 
F2d 281, 283 (9th Cir. 1975); People v. 
Zipprich, 490 NE2d 8, 10-11 (Ill. App. 
1986). 
94 See United States v. Hon, 904 F2d 
803, 8 10 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 
498 US 1069 (1991); United States v. 
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date,95 and labeling96 of evidence 
often will not result in exclusion. In 
one case a four-day delay, during 
which drugs and a gun remained in 
a police officer's car trunk, did not 
result in exclusion of the evidence. 97 
In another case, the court ruled that 
"[a]lthough the chain of custody for 
the bottles may not be perfect, we 
conclude that the district court did 
not abuse its discretion in admitting 
this evidence."98 
In United States v. Ladd,99 the 
First Circuit stated the rule as fol-
lows: 
In the last analysis, the prosecu-
tion's chain-of-custody evidence 
must be adequate-not infallible. 
Here, some links in the chain 
were rusty, but none were miss-
ing. Without question, the defense 
succeeded in showing a certain 
Clark, 425 F2d 827, 833 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 400 US 820 (1970). 
95 See United States v. Robinson, 967 
F2d 287,291 (9th Cir. 1992) ("govern-
ment concedes that there is a discrep-
ancy regarding the date of seizure"); 
United States v. Barcella, 432 F2d 570, 
572 (1st Cir. 1970). 
96 See United States v. Kelly, 14 F3d 
1169, 1175-1176 (7th Cir. 1994) (dis-
crepancy in inventory did not preclude 
admissibility of evidence); United 
States v.Ailocco, 234 F2d 955,956 (2d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 352 US 931 (1956); 
Ingle v. State, 377 NE2d 885, 892 (Ind. 
App. 1975); State v. Beaudoin, 386A2d 
731, 733 (Me. 1978); Renner v. Com-
missioner of Pub. Safety, 373 NW2d 
628, 632 (Minn. App. 1985). 
97 United States v. Logan, 949 F2d 
1370, 1377 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 
503 us 925 (1992). 
98 United States v. Johnson, 977 F2d 
1360, 1368 (lOth Cir. 1992), cert. de-
nied, 506 US 1070 (1993). 
99 885 F2d 954 (1st Cir. 1989). 
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sloppiness, regrettable in a foren-
sic laboratory. Yet the net effect 
of any such disarray on the au-
thenticity of the evidence de-
pended on what inferences a rea-
sonable factfinder might choose 
to draw from it. Where, as in this 
case, a trier chooses among plau-
sible (albeit competing) infer-
ences, appellate courts should not 
intrudeY)() 
Accordingly, the evidence was ad-
missible. The same court, however, 
ruled that another item of evidence 
should have been excluded due to a 
"missing link" that resulted from a 
discrepancy between laboratory 
identification numbers: "In short, 
there was no competent proof to in-
dicate that the sample extracted from 
Massey's corpse was the one which 
CSL tested. An important step in the 
custodial pavane was omitted."101 
Presumption of Regularity 
In satisfying its burden of proof, 
the prosecution is frequently aided 
by the so-called presumption of 
regularity. As one court has com-
mented: 
In the absence of any evidence to 
the contrary, the trial judge was 
entitled to assume that this offi-
cial would not tamper with the 
sack and can or their contents. 
100 Id. at 957. See also United States 
v. Scott, 19 F3d 1238, 1245 (7th Cir. 
1994) ("[T]he government does not 
need to prove a 'perfect' chain of cus-
tody, and any gaps in the chain go to 
the weight of the evidence and not its 
admissibility. In this case there was at 
most a minor gap in the chain of cus-
tody."); Kennedy v. State, 578 NE2d 
633, 639 (Ind. 1991). 
101 885 F2d at 957. 
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Where no evidence indicating 
otherwise is produced, the pre-
sumption of regularity supports 
the official acts of public offic-
ers, and courts presume that they 
have properly discharged their 
official duties. 102 
Several cases have extended the 
presumption to hospital person-
nel. 103 The presumption of regular-
ity, however, has been criticized. As 
Wigmore notes, the presumption of 
regularity has "more often [been] 
mentioned then enforced." 104 Some 
courts have also objected to its use: 
The presumption of regularity, if 
it can be dignified as a rule, does 
not serve as a substitute for evi-
dence when authenticity is, as 
here, challenged on not insub-
stantial grounds. At best it may 
relieve the government of the ne-
cessity for offering proof of cus-
102 Gallego v. United States, 276 F2d 
914, 917 (9th Cir. 1960). Accord United 
States v. Scott, 19 F3d 1238, 1245 (7th 
Cir.) ("In making this determination, the 
district court makes a 'presumption of 
regularity,' presuming that the govern-
ment officials who had custody of the 
exhibits discharged their duties prop-
erly."), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 163 
(1994); United States v. Kelly, 14 F3d 
1169, 1175 (7th Cir. 1994)("When there 
is no evidence of tampering, a presump-
tion of regularity attends the official acts 
of public officers in custody of evi-
dence; the courts presume they did their 
jobs correctly."); United States v. Miller, 
994 F2d 441, 444 (8th Cir. 1993) ("of-
ficials are entitled to the presumption 
of integrity"). 
103 Gass v. United States, 416 F2d 
767, 770 (DC Cir. 1969); Pasadena Re-
search Lab., Inc. v. United States, 169 
F2d 375, 381-382 (9th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 335 US 853 (1948). 
104 9 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2534, 
at 488 (3d ed. 1940). 
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tody until the integrity of the evi-
dence has been put in issue. 105 
Another has commented that the 
"Government's burden ... cannot 
be diluted by unwarranted presump-
tions about the evidence it seeks to 
introduce.'' 106 In sum, if the prosecu-
tion has met its burden of proof, the 
presumption of regularity is not 
needed. If the prosecution does not 
meet its burden, the presumption 
should not be used to save a defi-
ciency in proof. Therefore, the pre-
sumption should be discarded as 
both misleading and unnecessary. 
Methods of Proof 
The defense will often stipulate 
to the chain of custody. 107 As with 
all stipulations, however, care must 
be taken in the drafting. In one case, 
the stipulation failed to state that the 
material seized from the defendant 
was the same material tested by the 
chemist, and the appellate court held 
that admission was error. 108 
Absent a stipulation, the chain of 
custody typically is established, at 
least in part, by the testimony of the 
persons ("links") who had posses-
sion of the object. These witnesses 
may refresh their recollections by 
referring to any available documen-
tation. 109 
105 United States v. Starks, 515 F2d 
112, 122 (3d Cir. 1975). 
106 United States v. Lampson, 627 
F2d 62, 65 (7th Cir. 1980). 
107 E.g., People v. Perine, 402 NE2d 
847, 849 (Ill. App. 1980) (chain of cus-
tody stipulated). 
108 People v. Maurice, 202 NE2d, 
480, 481 (Ill. 1964). 
109 See Fed. R. Evict. 612 (use of writ-
ings to refresh memory); United States 
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Habit Evidence 
The proponent may also intro-
duce evidence of habit or routine 
practice to establish the chain of 
custody. Federal Rule 406 provides 
that evidence of the routine practice 
of an organization is relevant to 
prove that the conduct of the orga-
nization "on a particular occasion 
was in conformity with the ... rou-
tine practice." Accordingly, evi-
dence of the standard operating pro-
cedures of police departments and 
laboratories in safeguarding real 
evidence may be used to establish 
the chain of custody. 110 
Documentary Evidence 
Sometimes the chain of custody 
has been established by documen-
tary evidence. 111 For example, courts 
have held that laboratory slides and 
labels on specimen bottles fall 
within the federal Business Records 
Act because they had been prepared 
v. Stevenson, 445 F2d 25, 27 (7th Cir.) 
(in establishing chain of custody, offic-
ers "refreshed their recollection from 
official records"); cert. denied, 404 US 
857 (1971). 
110 See United States v. Jones, 687 
F2d 1265, 1267 (8th Cir. 1982) (evi-
dence handled by government accord-
ing to "established procedures"); 
United States v. Luna, 585 F2d I, 6 (1st 
Cir.) ("normal police procedure"), cert. 
denied, 439 US 852 (1978); United 
States v. Burris, 393 F2d 81, 83 (7th 
Cir. 1968) (chemist testified about stan-
dard procedure of laboratory). 
111 E.g., United States v. Luna, 585 
F2d 1, 6 (1st Cir.) (police "accou_nt_ed 
for the evidence, either by official 
records or by testimony concerning 
normal police procedure"), cert. denied, 
439 US 852 (1978); Graham v. State, 
255 NE2d 652, 654 (Ind. 1970) ("po-
lice custody records" may be used to 
establish chain of custody). 
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by hospital personnel in the regular 
course of business. 112 
These cases, however, predate the 
adoption of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence. Federal Rule 803(8)(B), 
which governs the public records 
exception specifically excludes "in 
criminal cases matters observed by 
police officers and other law en-
forcement personnel. 113 According 
to the legislative history, this exclu-
sion was based on the belief that 
"observations by police officers at 
the scene of the crime or the appre-
hension of the defendant are not as 
reliable as observations by public 
officials in other cases because of the 
adversarial nature of the confronta-
tion between the police and the de-
fendant in criminal cases." 114 The 
scope of the police records exclu-
sion has divided the courts. Some 
courts seem to apply a per se rule, 
under which all police reports are 
automatically excluded, 115 while 
others have adopted a more flexible 
approach. For example, some courts 
have held that Congress "did not 
intend to exclude [police] records of 
. d . I tt "116 routme, nona versar1a rna ers. 
112 See United States v. Duhart, 496 
F2d 941 944 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 
419 US '967 (1974); Gass v. United 
States, 416 F2d 7 67, 771 (DC Cir. 
1969); Wheeler v. United States, 211 
F2d 19, 22-23 (DC Cir. 1953), cert. 
denied, 347 US 1019 (1954). 
H3 See also Mil. R. Evid. 803(6), 
803(8) (specifying that "chain of cus-
tody documents" are admissible). 
114 s. Rep. No. 1277, 93 Cong., 2d 
Sess. 17, reprinted in 1974 USCCAN 
7051,7064. 
Hs See United States v. Ruffin, 575 
F2d 346, 356 (2d Cir. 1978); Unit~d 
States v. Oates, 560 F2d 45, 67 (2d C1r. 
1977). 
ll 6 United States v. Hernandez-Rojas, 
617 F2d 533, 535 (9th Cir.), cert. de-
CRIMINAL LAW BULLETIN 
Chain of custody records should 
be considered routine nonadver-
sarial records. The habitual use of 
chain of custody documents is the 
most reliable way to ensure that 
there is not a break in the chain. 
Their use should be encouraged. In 
a civil paternity action filed by the 
state, the court rejected a chain-of-
custody challenge to DNA results be-
cause a laboratory supervisor testified: 
The [chain of custody] document 
was developed in order to allow 
the supervisor to confirm the 
chain of custody without having 
to bring numerous laboratory per-
sonnel to court. Dr. Harmon thor-
oughly discussed the document 
and its safety devices. She testi-
fied in detail as to her laboratory's 
procedures for drawing blood 
samples and assuring proper iden-
tification of both the individuals 
having the test and the blood 
samples drawn from those indi-
viduals. She testified that once the 
blood samples were received by 
the laboratory they were checked 
for any sign of tampering. 117 
Another issue concerns the rela-
tionship between the public records 
exception and other hearsay excep-
tions. Several courts have held that 
documents subject to exclusion un-
der the public records exception are 
not admissible under any other hear-
nied, 449 US 864 (1980); United States 
v. Orozco, 590 F2d 789, 793 (9th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 439 US 1049 (1979). 
117 J.E.B. v. State, 606 So. 2d 156, 
157 (Ala. Civ. App. 1992), cert. denied, 
1992 Ala. Lexis 1296 (Ala. Oct. 12, 
1992), rev'd and remanded, J.E.B. v. 
Alabama ex rei. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419 
(1994). 
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say exception. 118 This interpretation 
would preclude the admissibility of 
chain of custody documents as busi-
ness records 119 or as recorded recol-
lection 120 if those documents are in-
admissible as police records under 
Rule 803(8). This view, however, is 
not accepted by all courts. 121 
United States v. Coleman 122 is one 
of the few cases dealing with the 
admissibility of chain of custody 
documents under the Federal Rules. 
The defendant contended that police 
reports are never admissible when 
offered by the prosecution, and thus 
DEA forms of chemical analysis and 
lock-seal envelopes containing no-
tations of the date, time, and loca-
tion of the sale of heroin and an iden-
tification of the seller by a John Doe 
number were inadmissible. The 
court rejected this argument, hold-
ing that the documents were not un-
reliable on the ground that they were 
prepared for the purpose of litiga-
tion. Although the court recognized 
that the forms "have certain indicia 
of 'police reports,' " it found that the 
118 See United States v. Oates, 560 
F2d 45 (2d Cir. 1977). 
119 Fed. R. Evid. 803(6). 
12° Fed. R. Evid. 803(5). 
121 Several courts have found the con-
gressional purpose of excluding police 
reports under Rule 803(8) was intended 
to apply only when such reports were 
admitted in lieu of testimony. United 
States v. King, 613 F2d 670, 673 (7th 
Cir. 1980); United States v. Sawyer, 607 
F2d 1190, 1193 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. 
denied, 445 US 943 (1980). 
122 631 F2d 908 (DC Cir. 1980). 
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forms and lock-sealed envelopes 
contained "only skeletal informa-
tion, and are prepared not solely with 
an eye towards presentation, but to-
wards preserving a record of the 
chain of custody." 123 
123 Id. at 912. 
Chain of custody documents have 
also been challenged on confronta-
tion grounds but not succcessfully. 124 
124 But see Payne v. Janasz, 711 F2d 
1305, 1313-1314 (6th Cir. 1983) (ad-
mission of evidence tag bearing inscrip-
tion "10001 Cedar Avenue" did not vio-
late right of confrontation). 
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